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TORT ACTION IN KENTUCKY FOR THE WRONGFUL
DESTRUCTION OF A WILL
In the case of Allen v. Lovell's Adr'x.1 the Kentucky Court
of Appeals recently had before it the question whether or not an
action in tort will lie for the wrongful. destruction of a will. A
beneficiary under the will had sued the alleged spoliator to recover the value of the legacy he would have received had the
will been probated. Recovery was denied on the ground that the
plaintiff's petition did not allege that the will had ever been
offered for probate as a lost or destroyed will and failed to show,
or even allege, any reason why it could -not be probated. The
court stated by way of dictum, however, that if the situation were
such that the will had been wrongfully destroyed and could not be
probated because of the loss of evidence an action in tort could
be maintained against the wrongdoer. The rule in Kentucky with
regard to fraudulently destroyed wills, as indicated by the Allen
case, appears to be as follows: If the will can be proven sufficiently to be probated as a lost will, resort must be had to the probate
court; if the will cannot be probated, an action in tort will lie for
damages caused by the wrongful destruction.
The above proposition suggests the question: Under what
circumstances will a suitor have sufficient evidence to maintain
an action at law for the loss of a legacy and yet have insufficient
evidence to establish his right to that legacy in a probate court?
In order to probate a lost will in Kentucky its execution, its contents, and its continued existence unrevoked by the testator must
be established.' In the absence of any one of these elements it is
difficult to see how a tort action could be maintained. If the will
was never executed nothing was destroyed; if some evidence of its
contents cannot be presented the complainant cannot show that he
ever had even an expectancy* and if it did not remain unrevoked by
the testator it was the act of the testator, mot the act of the spoliator,
that deprived the complainant of his gift.
'303 Ky. 238, 197 S.W 2d 424 (1946)
Allen v Lovell's Adm'x, 303 Ky. 238, 243, 197 S.W 2d 424, 426
(1946).
'Caudill v. Loar, 293 Ky. 223, 168 S.W 2d 757 (1943) Madden
v. Sevier, 271 Ky 688, 113 S.W 2d 41 (1938) Pritchard v. Harvey
272 Ky 58, 113 S.W 2d 865 (1938) Rowland v Holt, 253 Ky 718,
70 S.W 2d 5 (1934) Ferguson v Billups, 244 Ky 85, 50 S.W 2d 35
(1932) Wood v. Wood, 241 Ky 506, 44 S.W 2d 539 (1931) Baltzell
& Lilly v Ates, 181 Ky. 413, 205 S.W 548 (1918) Bradshaw v Butler,
125 Ky. 162, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 1249, 100 S.W 837 (1907), Chisholm's
Heirs v. Ben, Celia, &c, 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 408 (1847).
The same three elements are required in other jurisdictions
generally. Evans, The Probate of Lost Wills (1945) 24 NEB. L. REV.
283.
L.J.-4
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The court apparently recognized the right to an action in tort
on the theory that there may be a difference in the character and
degree of evidence required in the two types of cases. It has been
held consistently that in order to probate a lost will each of the
essential elements must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.' The term "clear and convincing evidence" is not as objective as it might be but it evidently represents a higher requirement than the preponderance of probabilities or weight of evidence ordinarily required in civil cases. A situation might well be
supposed in which it could be shown-by the weight of the evidence
that a beneficiary would be entitled to a legacy under a will if
the will had not been destroyed, and yet such beneficiary would find
himself unable to satisfy the substantive requirements of the probate court so as to probate the destroyed will. This can be better
understood if it is always kept clearly in mind that in the tort
action no attempt is made to probate the will or to take anything
from the estate. Recovery is sought against the wrongdoer and
the complainant, if successful, gets a personal judgment against
him, the principle being the same as in any other action for damages
for interference with the plaintiff's advantageous relations or prospective benefits. The proceeding is an ordinary action at law in
which it is alleged that the plaintiff could establish his claim to a
legacy if the defendant had not destroyed his evidence, viz., the will.
By the destruction of that evidence the defendant has deprived the
plaintiff of his gift and should be held accountable for it.
In such an action the plaintiff has the added advantage of being
materially aided by the presumption that exists against a wrongdoer who suppresses or destroys documents material to litigation
against him.6 The tort action is always directly against the person
41Madden v Sevier, 271 Ky. 688, 113 S.W 2d 41 (1938) Pritchard
v. Harvey, 272 Ky 58, 113 S.W 2d 865 (1938), Ferguson v. Billups,
244 Ky. 85, 50 S.W 2d 35 (1932).
'An action for the destruction of evidence is similar to an action
against a witness who, after being personally served with a subpoena
duces tecum, disobeyed the subpoena and caused the litigant to be
non-suited. Such an action has long been recognized both in England
and in the United States. Lane v. Cole, 12 Barb. 680 (N.Y. 1852),
Davis v. Lovell, 4 M. & W 678, 150 Eng. Rep. R. 1593 (1839). In
Lane v. Cole it was even held that recovery might be had in such a
case without showing that the plaintiff had a good cause of action
in the case for which the subpoena was issued.
At an early date Chief Justice Holt stated, "
that if a man
destroys a thing that is designed to be evidence against himself, a
small matter will supply it." Anon. 1 Ld. Raym. 731, 91 Eng. Rep. R.
1388 (1698). This doctrine appears to be well established in both
England and America.
In an action on a promissory note it was held that if the jury
found that the defendant gave the note for valuable consideration
and later destroyed the note, they had a right to infer that it was
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who allegedly destroyed the instrument. In such a case the jury
will be allowed to draw an inference that the instrument, if it
could be produced, would support the plaintiff's case.' Thus, instead of the plaintiff having the burden of establishing the essential
elements of the will by "clear and convincing" evidence, he is
provided with an inference against his adversary and placed in a
position at the outset in which only slight evidence will be sufficient to support his case.' It has been held that the wrongful
destruction of an evidentiary document by a litigant creates a
conclusive presumption that its contents were as claimed by the
adversary I If such should be the rule it would appear that in the
tort action for the destruction of a will the plaintiff would have
little more to prove than that the instrument was actually destroyed by the wrongdoer. Once that fact were established the
presumption would arise that it was properly executed, that it
was unrevoked by the testator, and that its contents were as
alleged by the plaintiff.
Such an inference or presumption does not arise in the probate court, for there the action is -not against the spoliator but is
a direct in rem action for the probate of the will, and may -be
contested by any or all persons interested in the estate. It should
also be noted that the wrongful destruction must be satisfactorily
proved before any inference can be drawn. The proper procedure
is to prove the wrongful destruction of the document and then
permit the jury to draw such inference concerning its being unfavorable to the alleged spoliator as all the circumstances justify.
The inference will be particularly strong where it is shown that
the wrongdoer is an heir or other person who would tend to
profit by defeating the will.
Even in the absence of any inference against the defendant
the plaintiff might find it possible to satisfy the requirements
properly executed. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 188 Mass. 380, 74 N.E. 608
(1905).
The defendant's destruction of a partnership account book after
suit was brought was held sufficient to justify an inference that the
accounts were as alleged by the plaintiff. Pomeroy v Benton, 77 Mo.
64, 85-86 (1882)
The secretary of a lodge, one of several defendants in an action
in which the lodge records were material, destroyed the records
after action was brought. It was held that the destruction was sufficient to raise a presumption that the recordS, if .produced, would be
injurious to the defendants. Harrill v. Penn, 134 Okl. 259, 273 Pac.
235 (1927)
See generally, 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1940) sec. 291, Evans,
Torts to Expectancies in Decedents' Estates (1944) 93 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 187, 197.
'In re Holmes' Estate, 98 Colo. 360, 56 P 2d 1333 (1936).
'Anderson v. Irwin, 101 Ill. 411 (1882), Anon., 1 Ld. Raym. 731,
91 Eng. Rep. R. 1388 (1698).
"Middleton v. Middleton, 188 Ark. 1022, 68 S.W 2d 1003 (1934).
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of an action at law where the -mere weight of the evidence will
permit him to prevail when he could not provide the "clear and
convincing" evidence required in the probate court. Thus in
Michigan where it is declared by statute that the testimony of
at least two witnesses is necessary to establish a lost will in a probate court,0 it has been held that the testimony of one witness is
sufficient to maintain an action in tort against a person who
wrongfully destroyed the will." Likewise in North Carolina where
it is apparently required that the entire contents of a lost will be
proved before any part can be probated, " it is held that an action
in tort may be maintained against a spoliator by proving the gift
to the plaintiff only " In such situations no effect is given to the
will itself. The court in reality finds that the will could be given
effect had it not been for the wrongful act of the defendant. The
injured party is then given a remedy not in the nature of specific
performance of the will, but in the form of a judgment against the
wrongdoer.
Future cases will be necessary to mark the limits of the tort
action first recognized in Kentucky by dictum in the Allen case,
but from the above principles on which the action is based it can
be seen that it has a proper place in our legal system. While the
tort itself is new the principle involved is old,'4 and even if statu103 ComP. LAws MICH. (1929) sec. 15547.
"Creek v. Laski, 248 Mich. 425, 227 N.W 817, 65 A.L.R. 1113,
1119 (1929).

This specific problem would not arise in Kentucky since Kentucky permits a lost will to be established by only one .witness.
Baker v Dobyns, 34 Ky (4 Dana.) 220 (1836). However, it is an
illustration of the fact that a lower degree of evidence may be sufficient to maintain a tort action for destruction of a will than is
essential to satisfy the requirements of a probate court.
-"Any person desireous of establishing the contents of a will
destroyed as aforesaid, there being no copy thereof, may file his
petition in the office of the clerk of the superior court, setting forth
the entire contents thereof, according to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief
" 2 GEN. STAT. N.C. (1943)
sec. 98-6.
"In the course of its opinion the court stated, "If she cannot
prove the destroyed will because unable to prove the entire contents
thereof,
surely she is entitled to recover of the defendants for
the wrong they have done her by the conspiracy and destruction of
the will, and the measure of her damages will be the legacy of which
she has been deprived." Dublin v.Bailey, 172 N.C. 608, 90 S.E. 689,
690 (1916).
' 4 As far back as 1746 a similar remedy was recognized in England. A disappointed heir suppressed a valid will and the husband
of the beneficiary, without attempting to probate the will, brought a
bill in equity for a decree commanding the heir to pay the legacy.
The decree was granted the court saying, "I think in such cases of
malicious and fraudulent spoliations, the court will not put the
plaintiff under the difficulty of going into the ecclesiastical court,
[the court of probate at that time] where he must meet with much
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tory grounds were considered necessary such could be found.'"
The tort here recognized might also be considered as nothing
more than another application of the doctrine that an action may be
maintained for 'wilful interference with the advantageous economic
situation of another. Such a tort has long been'recognized against
one who by threats or violence frightens away the prospective
workmen or customers of another," or who by spiteful shooting
frightens away another's game." It has been extended to include
the fraudulent interference with a mere expectancy 11 and there
appears to be no reason why it should not be applied to the destruction of a will when the wrongful act was done for the deliberate purpose of depriving the prospective beneficiary of his
gift. It should be noted that where the action has been maintained
for such wrongful interference with advantageous economic relations, the element of fraud or wrongful intent has usually been
present, and that where damages were sought for mere negligent
interference recovery has been denied.' Since there is such a
close similarity between the 'wrongful destruction of a will and the
other situations where wrongful interference with economic advantages has been recognized as a tort, an action for mere negligent spoliation would most likely fail. However, there appears
no theoretical reason why~negligent interference with one's favorable economic relations is not as much a civil wrong as any
other negligent act for which damages are allowed, and it is not
impossible that the law may change in this respect.
In some cases of the past in which attempts to probate destroyed
wills have been unsuccessful because the propounder was unable to
produce the required "clear and convincing" evidence, it is probable
that his real difficulty lay in the fact that he misconceived his
remedy, and that the action should have been one in tort with no
effort to give effect to the will itself. An examination of some of the
earlier cases might aid in determining when an opportunity for such
a remedy could exist.
In Chishoim's Hetrs v. Ben, Celia, &c' the probate of a lost will
was denied on the ground that its due execution and contents were
more difficulty than proving the contents of a deed at law, which
has been lost or secreted." Tucker v Phipps, 3 Atk. 360, 26 Eng. Rep.
R. 1008 (1746).
"The fraudulent concealment or destruction of a will in Kentucky is a criminal offense. Ky. R.S. (1946) sec. 434.280. Any person
injured by violation of a criminal statute is given a right to recover
damages from the offender. Ky. R.S. (1946) sec. 446.070.
" Tarleton v McGawley, Peak 270, 170 Eng. Rep. R. 153 (1793),
Garret v. Taylor, Cro. Jac. 567, 79 Eng. Rep. R. 485 (1621)
" Keeble v. Heckerngill, 11 East. 574, 103 Eng. Rep. R. 1127
(1809).
'iMitchell v Langley, 143 Ga. 827, 85 S.E. 1050 (1915).
"Balden v. Shorter, 1 Ch. (1933) 427.
'46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 408 (1847).
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insufficiently proved. In that case one of the two principal witnesses
was impeached and the other was of doubtful credibility. The court
indicated, however, that if it had been a case of clear spoliation
where all doubts could properly have been resolved against the
wrongdoer, a different result might have been reached.'
In numerous Kentucky cases it has been held that declarations
of the alleged testator may be admitted as corroborative evidence of
the essential elements necessary to probate a lost will but that they
are insufficient of themselves to establish those elements.' Since
they are admissible,' if the wrongful destruction could first be
pinned upon the person who would tend to profit by the failure of
the will, and an inference, thereby be created against him, these
declarations might well be considered corroborative of this inference and enable the jury, from all the circumstances, to find in
favor of the. disappointed legatee in an action in tort. Such evidence
would be insufficient in probate proceedings, for to permit a will to
be established by oral statements would evade the requirement of
the Wills Act that it be in writing. However, in a tort action if the
wrongful destruction can be otherwise shown and the inference of
the validity of the will thus be created, there appears no reason why
the declarations of the testator should not be admitted. These would
show his state of mind and would be corroborative.
Another possible application of the tort recognized in the Allen
case is an action for damages caused by the added expense imposed
upon the legatee even in situations where he was successful in the
probate of the will. In Taylor v. Bennettn the defendant spoliated a
will. The legatee succeeded in probating the instrument in spite of
the fraudulent act of the wrongdoer but incurred additional expense in doing so that would not have been necessary but for the
act of the defendant. In a separate action he was permitted to recover from the defendant that additional expense. Such a result
seems reasonable since the action is essentially one for the destruction of evidence and the plaintiff should' not be precluded from recovery merely because his damage was not as great as the defendant
might have hoped or anticipated.
Another consideration is that a judgment in an action in tort
does not seem to preclude a subsequent action for the probate of
" Id. at 411.
'Ferguson v. Billups, 244
Wood, 241 Ky. 506, 44 S.W 2d
77 Ky. (14 Bush) 434 (1879)
"McKelvey gives strong
ations of a testator concerning

Ky 85, 50 S.W 2d 35 (1932), Wood v
539 (1931), Mercer's Adm'r v Mackin,

exception to the hearsay rule.

support to the admission of declarthe contents of a lost will as a proper
McKELVEY, EVIDENcE

405.
"Ky. R.S. (1946) sec. 394.040.
S1 Ohio C.D. 57 (1885).

(5th ed. 1944)
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the will,' and an unsuccessful attempt to probate the instrument
does not preclude a subsequent tort action for the wrongful destruction of it.' This is true even though both actions might involve the
same parties and the same issues since they are essentially different
causes of action.' Thus the beneficiary is given the opportunity of
pursuing either remedy without losing his right to the other.'
Should the dictum in the Allen case be accepted, then it appears
that the following principles may be stated as to the law in
Kentucky1. Where a will has been fraudulently destroyed for the
purpose of depriving a beneficiary of his gift, it should still be
probated if possible. If the probate is not possible a tort action
for damages may be maintained against the wrongdoer. The
possibility that a tort action would lie for a mere negligent destruction, although still open to question, is very unlikely under
the present state of the law.
2. While the due execution, contents, and continued existence of the will unrevoked by the testator at his death must
be shown by clear and convincing evidence in order to probate
a destroyed will, it appears that a tort action can be maintained
by the mere weight of the evidence.
3. While none of the essential elements necessary to the
probate of a destroyed will may be established by the declarations of the testator alone, there is reason to believe that they
might be considered sufficient to maintain a tort action where
the wrongful destruction by the one who benefited from the act
could first be shown and an inference thus be created against
him.
4. Neither an unsuccessful action for probate nor an unsuccessful action in tort can be considered res 3udicata as to the
other.
5. In case of a destroyed will it appears that a tort action
could be maintained for the wrongful destruction of evidence
even though the proponent were successful in the probate court.
'See Allen v. Lovell's Adm'x, 303 Ky. 238, 197 S.W 2d 424
(1946)
'Creek v. Laski, 248 Mich. 425, 227 N.W 817, 65 A.L.R. 1113,
1119 (1929).
' Ibid.
"This does not mean that the beneficiary would be allowed recovery in both actions. It would appear that a successful attempt to
probate would ipso facto preclude any tort action except possibly for
added expense in proving the will made necessary by the wrongful
destruction. Since the tort action is not allowed except when the
probate is impossible, there appears to be no occasion for attempt
to probate after success in tort. Consequently, a problem in double
recovery is not likely to arise.
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It is difficult to predict the future of Kentucky's recognition of
a tort in this type of case. However, it is believed that the doctrine
announced in Allen v. Lovel's Adm'x is sound, that it is well supported by both reason and authority, and that it represents a healthy
trend in this branch of the law.
BERTEL M. SPARKS

